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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is unfortunately renowned for being the world’s leader in
mass incarceration, sustaining a detention rate exceeding every other country.1 The
overall proportion of prisoners is remarkable. One out of every five prisoners
globally resides in America’s prisons and jails.2 The situation has become untenable
in part because of the sheer financial burden of operating the domestic prison
industrial complex.3 Consequently, bipartisan political and public support have
promoted policy reforms to slash incarceration numbers.4
Notably, algorithmic risk tools have become a weapon of choice to combat
mass incarceration.5 Selected studies find support for the role of science-informed
risk tools to help alleviate excessive rates of imprisonment by convincing decisionmakers that substantially more subjects may be safely supervised in their

* Professor of Law & Criminal Justice at the University of Surrey School of Law; PhD in criminology
and criminal justice, The University of Texas at Austin; J.D., The University of Texas School of Law. The
statistical research presented herein was supported by funding from the Koch Foundation.
1. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIM. & JUST. POL’Y RSCH., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (12th ed. 2020),
https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17,
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration
(the costs to American taxpayers to operate America’s prison systems are $80 billion a year).
4. Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CAL. L. REV. 439, 447 (2020).
5. Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think about Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 690 (2018).
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communities.6 The new algorithmic risk wave has been actively targeted to backend decisions, such as sentencing and parole. 7 More recently, the pretrial context
has become a “flashpoint” in efforts to reduce mass incarceration because of the
significant numbers of individuals who are detained pending their trials.8
The issues are more salient considering the risks of COVID-19 in confined
spaces amid crowded conditions.9 “So now, whatever public-safety risk is posed by
releasees must be weighed against the public-safety risk that detaining them under
such conditions could pose by spreading the disease, in addition to the risk to
prisoners themselves.”10
This essay reviews the advancement of risk assessment tools in criminal
justice generally and then discusses their role more specifically in pretrial settings.
Several potential advantages of risk tools as a progressive reform for pretrial are
explored, followed by relevant questions that deserve attention. For example, while
algorithmic risk may (or may not) achieve acceptable rates of accuracy in estimating
future risk, there is the potential that risk predictions may still be inequitable based
on minority or gender status. To highlight these salient issues, selected results are
employed from the author’s previous empirical studies on the performance of two
algorithmic risk tools in several pretrial jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment involves predicting an individual’s potential for a negative
criminal justice outcome, such as flight from justice or a new arrest.11 Appraising
the potential for future failures plays a role in various outcomes during an accused’s
journey through the criminal justice system, from decisions to arrest through parole
outcomes.12 A primary purpose of widespread risk predictions is to allow officials
to triage their populations and thus to manage them accordingly.13 Considering the
high-stakes environment of criminal justice, proper risk practices should strike a
reasonable balance among interests in public safety, protecting individual rights,
and the efficient use of limited resources.14

6. Kristin Bechtel et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, Bond Type,
and Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 447 (2017).
7. Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 67 (2017).
8. Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, Public’s Views of Risk Assessment Algorithms and Pretrial
Decision Making, 26 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (2020).
9. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Reforming Pretrial Decision-Making, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857, 880-81
(2020).
10. J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle, & Sonja B. Starr, Understanding Violent Crime Recidivism, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1647 (2020).
11. Garrett & Monahan, supra note 4, at 450.
12. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 724–25 (2011).
13. John Monahan, Preface: Recidivism Risk Assessment in the 21st Century, in HANDBOOK OF
RECIDIVISM RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOLS xxiii, xxiii (Jay P. Singh et al. eds., 2018).
14. Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention
on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 788–89 (2019).
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Historically, such predictions have been based on intuition or the personal
experience of the particular official responsible for making the relevant decision. 15
A more modern trend is to rely upon scientific evidence that explains offending
patterns.16
The “evidence-based practices movement” is the now popular term to
describe the turn to behavioral sciences data to improve risk-based
classifications. Scientific studies targeting recidivism outcomes are
benefiting from the compilation of large datasets (i.e., big data) of
discharged offenders. Researchers track the offenders post-release,
observe recidivism rates, and then statistically test which factors
correlate with recidivism. Risk assessment tool developers use
computer modeling to combine factors of sufficiently high correlation
and weight them accordingly using increasingly complex algorithms.17
An algorithm is simply an equation in which inputs are received and processed
to produce a quantitatively-derived output.18 Risk tools often convert such
quantitative outputs into categorical buckets—e.g., low, medium, and high risk—to
permit partitioning the correctional population according to levels of predicted
likelihood of failure.19
Risk algorithms have transformed criminal justice into a “data-driven decisionmaking” machine.11F20 This form of algorithmic governance21 is a novel strategy to
battle mass incarceration.22 Officials are using risk tools to help them divert low-risk
defendants or reserve prison beds for those at highest risk.23 In other words,

15. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
537, 556 (2015).
16. Yoav Mehozay & Eran Fisher, The Epistemology of Algorithmic Risk Assessment and the Path
Towards a Non-Penology Penology, 21 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 523, 531 (2019).
17. Melissa Hamilton, Debating Algorithmic Fairness, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 261, 266 (2019).
“Evidence-based practice . . . is any correctional practice or intervention whose effectiveness at
achieving its stated goal is supported by ‘empirically sound’ research of some kind.” Klingele, supra note
15, at 556.
18. Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 543, 545 (2018).
See also OSONDE A. OSOBA ET AL., RAND, ALGORITHMIC EQUITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL APPLICATIONS ix (2019),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2708/RAND_RR2708.pdf
(characterizing algorithms as “advanced decision–making or decision support artifacts that exhibit
‘intelligent behavior’”).
19. Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law as Public Ordering, 70 U. TORONTO L.J. 64, 81 (2020).
20. DANIELE KEHL ET AL., ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK
ASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 3 (2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041.
21. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Algorithmic Risk Governance: Big Data Analytics, Race and Information
Activism in Criminal Justice Debates, 23 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 453, 454 (2018).
22. Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think about Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 690 (2018).
23. Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Risk Assessment Instruments in U.S.
Correctional Settings, 13 PSYCHOL. SERVS. 206 (2016).
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algorithm-based risk assessment tools are popular in informing decisions
concerning whether to incarcerate or release.24
Proponents thereby view algorithmic risk assessment as an objective and
reasonable way to reduce mass incarceration without sacrificing public safety.25
Across criminal justice systems, the “offender risk assessment enterprise has been
moving at warp speed since the turn of the millennium and shows no signs of
slowing”26 and is widely considered to represent industry best practice in risk
evaluation. 27
The algorithmic turn specifically assists in pretrial systems to respond to the
significant contribution that pretrial detention numbers in local jails make to
excessive incarceration rates.28 The Prison Policy Initiative has crunched the
numbers: “Pretrial detention is responsible for all of the net jail growth in the last
twenty years.”29 Today, twenty percent of the nation’s combined prison and jail
population is comprised of individuals yet to be convicted.30 At any time, about
500,000 inmates are awaiting their trial dates.31 In local jails, pretrial inmates
outnumber those convicted of crimes and serving their sentences: three-quarters
of inmates in America’s jails have not been convicted of any crime.32 A related
consequence is that one in five local jails is operating at or over capacity.33
Consequently, pretrial’s role in mass incarceration set the stage for adoption
algorithmic tools as a main reform. 34 The Science Bench Book for Judges from the
National Judicial College conceptualizes risk assessment algorithms as the “most
24. Carolyn McKay, Predicting Risk in Criminal Procedure: Actuarial Tools, Algorithms, AI and
Judicial Decision-Making, 32 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 22–39 (2020); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 494 (2018).
25. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 305 (2018). See
generally Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2019)
(providing a background on criminal justice advancements and analyzing, as well as advocating,
empirically based approaches to adopting policy).
26. J. Stephen Wormith, Automated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 281
(2017).
27. Bechtel, supra note 6, at 446; Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and
Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 232 (2015) [hereinafter Hamilton 2],
http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/842342.
28. COLIN DOYLE ET AL., HARV. LAW SCH., BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 7
(2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=9a
804d1d-f9be-e0f0-b7cd-cf487ec70339&forceDialog=0.
29. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
30. WILL DOBBIE & CRYSTAL YANG, HAMILTON PROJECT, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. PRETRIAL SYSTEM
4 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/DobbieYang_PP_20190314.pdf.
31. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES IN 2018 1 (Mar. 2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf.
32. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 29.
33. ZENG, supra note 31, at 8.
34. Mitali Nagrecha et al., Court Culture and Criminal Law Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 84 (2020),
https://dlj.law.duke.edu/2020/04/courtculture/.
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ubiquitous form of predictive technology used in the criminal pretrial context,” and
constitutes a critical weapon in the judiciary’s “arsenal of justice.” 35
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR ALGORITHMS
Reformers advocate the deployment of algorithmic risk tools to serve several
goals in pretrial justice reforms which are, directly and indirectly, related to
reasonably curtailing pretrial jail populations. The objectives, albeit with some
overlap amongst them, include curtailing rates of detention, reducing reliance upon
bail, mitigating human biases in decision-making, improving the justifiability of
detention decisions, and conserving criminal justice resources.
A. Reduce Detention Rates
In a pretrial setting, judges are typically the final arbiters of whether jailed
individuals are eligible for release.36 Detaining those not convicted might appear
improper,37 but the practice is lawful when due process is followed.38 The United
States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Salerno (1987) confirmed the
constitutionality of ordering pretrial detention reliant upon a judge’s own
guesstimate of the defendant’s future dangerousness.39 The Court accepted that an
appropriate balance justified this conclusion: “In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” 40
Judges at pretrial thereby face conflicting goals: “Pretrial decision-making
involves a fundamental tension between the court’s desire to protect citizens from
dangerous criminals, ensure that accused individuals are judged before the law, and
minimize the amount of pretrial punishment meted out to legally innocent
defendants.”41 Courts should also be cognizant that pretrial detention has
35. Veronica Alicea-Galvan, Pre-Trial Criminal, in SCIENCE BENCH BOOK FOR JUDGES 201, 205 (Peggy
Hora et al. eds., 2020), https://www.judges.org/wp-content/uploads/Chapter6-SBB.pdf.
36. Brandon P. Martinez et al., Time, Money, and Punishment: Institutional Racial-Ethnic
Inequalities in Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, 66 CRIME & DELINQ. 837, 839 (2020).
37. “Detaining a person before he is found guilty of a crime is a particularly draconian decision for
the state to make. Pretrial detention is one of the most severe things that can happen to a person: the
detainee immediately loses his freedom, and can also lose his family, health, home, job, and community
ties.” OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE GLOBAL OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 7 (2014),
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/de4c18f8-ccc1-4eba-9374-e5c850a07efd/presumption-guilt09032014.pdf.
38. Hafsa S. Mansoor, Guilty Until Proven Guilty: Effective Bail Reform as a Human Rights
Imperative,
DEPAUL
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3566273_code3824600.pdf?abstractid=3566273&
mirid=1.
39. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
40. Id. at 755.
41. THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT 4
(2010), http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/Validation-of-the-COMPAS-Risk-AssessmentClassification-Instrument.pdf.
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significant downstream consequences, including increasing the likelihood of
conviction, the severity of sentence, the number of future contacts with criminal
justice agencies, barriers to stable employment, and limits on access to social safety
nets.42 A relevant formula suggests an algorithmic tool will allow judges to “(1)
Maximize public safety and (2) Maximize court appearance while (3) Maximizing
release from custody.”43
The terminology has evolved since Salerno from the vagueness of “future
dangerousness” to a more refined perspective of “risk assessment.” 44 Relatedly,
such predictions have over the last three decades moved from the unstructured
decision-making by individual judges to the standardization and science offered by
algorithmic tools, at least in those jurisdictions who have adopted such
technologies.45
While an ethical rule of thumb might be to release those who have not yet
been convicted of any crime, judges who tend to be risk averse order pretrial
detention as a means to ensure the defendants’ appearance for trial and/or to
protect the community from potential offending if released. 46 Erring on the side of
caution thereby partly explains the significant number of pretrial detainees.47
Reformers contend that reliance upon scientifically-informed algorithms will
reduce the use of detention.48 While algorithmic risk scores are not meant to
entirely displace human judgements, these technological, decision-support
datapoints may allow judges to isolate those who actually pose a high risk of failure;
consequently, judges may be more confident to discharge the rest.49 The evidencebased platform might further encourage bolstering release rates by insulating
judges from allegations that they wrongfully released an individual who
endangered the public.50 Thus, if a released offender commits some bad act, the
scientific foundation of the tools offers an objective explanation.51

42. See generally Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2017).
43. MICHAEL R. JONES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
OPTION
4
(2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/AbstractDB/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=269164.
44. KIRK HEILBRUN ET AL., EVALUATION OF VIOLENCE RISK IN ADULTS 74, 76 (2009),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299925474_Evaluation_of_Violence_Risk_in_Adults.
45. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
537 (2015).
46. Brandon Buskey, Wrestling with Risk: The Questions Beyond Money Bail, 98 N.C. L. REV. 379,
384 (2020).
47. Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding Problems with
Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 185, 186 (2019).
48. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of
Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1729 (2018).
49. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 515 (2018).
50. Michael O’Hear, Actuarial Risk Assessment at Sentencing, Potential Consequences for Mass
Incarceration and Legitimacy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 193, 199 (2020).
51. Harry Surden, Ethics of AI in Law: Basic Questions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI
(Marcus D. Dubber et al. eds., forthcoming 2020).
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B. Reduce Reliance Upon Bail Systems
In many jurisdictions, even if a judge considers an individual at little risk of
failure, the judge may order that release be contingent upon posting some sort of
security to mitigate any risk.52 A bond is typically intended as a means of
encouraging the individual’s return for court dates without new arrest charges. 53
The amount of bond is not always tied to an estimate of the individual’s ability to
pay it or to the likelihood of compliance with the law. 54 Some systems employ bail
schedules that use the pending criminal charge as a proxy for the risk of flight or
rearrest; the more severe the charge, the greater the amount of security required.55
Reliance upon bail systems contributes significantly to jail population counts,
and thus exacerbates mass incarceration. 56 Bail systems that do not link the bond
to correspond with the individual’s ability to pay inevitably drive up their pretrial
jail population numbers.57 Many defendants otherwise eligible for release remain
behind bars simply because they cannot afford the bond.58 These results contradict
the foundation of a risk assessment system as individuals who continue to be
detained based on financial disability can present lower risk profiles than those who
are released after posting bail.59
Other contributions to incarceration counts are explained by studies that
show that pretrial detention is associated with increases in conviction rates, the
likelihood of a sentence involving a prison term, and sentence length.60 Moreover,
incarceration is itself criminogenic in nature in that those who are detained—
including in a preconviction context—are more likely to offend in the future. 61 In
52. Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail
Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 728 n.132 (2018).
53. Id.
54. COLIN DOYLE ET AL., BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 7 (2019),
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu.
55. VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 32 (2015),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf.
56. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 949 (2020).
57. Id. at 949–50.
58. Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CAL. L. REV. 439, 442 (2020); SARAH
PICARD ET AL., CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, BEYOND THE ALGORITHM: PRETRIAL REFORM, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND
RACIAL
FAIRNESS
3
(2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/beyondthealgorithm.pdf.
59. EMILY TIRY ET AL., URBAN INST., ROAD MAP TO PRETRIAL REFORMS 2 (2016),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/road-map-pretrial-reforms/view/full_report; Arthur Rizer
& Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can Make our Jail System More Efficient, Equitable, and Just, 23
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 187 (2018).
60. Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention
on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 791 (2018); Megan Stevenson &
Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE ACADEMY FOR
JUSTICE 21, 22 n.5 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (citing studies).
61. Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE DENIED: THE HARMFUL AND LASTING
EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 6 (2019) (citing studies).
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contrast, for many lower risk pretrial detainees, early release materially curtails
their risk of failure, thereby allowing them to avoid the jail’s revolving door, which
otherwise further contributes to mass incarceration.62
Thus, bail reformers, with the support of the American Bar Association and
the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, advocate risk assessment
tools in pretrial settings to reduce reliance upon money bail as a means of procuring
defendants’ compliance, with the result of boosting release rates.63
C. Mitigate Human Biases
Historically, judgements about an individual’s likelihood to fail have typically
been based on the gut instinct or the personal experience of the official responsible
for making the relevant management decision.64 Critics challenge those sorts of
predictions as suffering from implicit and explicit human biases.65 Judges in a
pretrial context may rely upon oversimplified heuristics because they typically have
few interactions with the defendants, limited access to relevant information, and
insufficient time for full deliberation.66 Pretrial detention hearings are brief and
often without the assistance of defense counsel who may otherwise provide the
judge with more contextualizing information about the defendant’s prospects for
success that could counter these biases and heuristics.67 Remarkably, these types
of cognitive shortcuts are more likely to dictate detention. Judges’ uncorrected
biases tend toward the direction of overestimating the potential of pretrial
defendants to flee or endanger public safety.68

62. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of
Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1769 (2018).
63. E.g., TODD SHAUGHNESSY, J. ET AL., REPORT TO THE UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL ON PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
SUPERVISION PRACTICES 16 (2015).
64. See Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: And Then
Some, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010).
65. Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 52
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2018); Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV.
519, 523 (2019); see also Chelsea Barabas, Beyond Bias: Re-Imagining the Terms of “Ethical AI” in
Criminal Law, 12 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 84, 95 (2020) (“[I]mplicit bias is understood as a
phenomenon which ‘is somehow apart from us yet can infect our decision-making . . . as opposed to
something that is variously, but systematically, cultivated and maintained.’”) (citing Anna Lauren
Hoffman, Where Fairness Fails: On Data, Algorithms, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Discourse, 22
INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 900 (2019)).
66. Hafsa S. Mansoor, Guilty Until Proven Guilty: Effective Bail Reform as a Human Rights
Imperative, DEPAUL L. REV, at 18, 21 (forthcoming 2020). Nonetheless, the speedy nature of pretrial
decision-making is not solely a negative attribute. Quick decisions may lead to earlier releases, thereby
reducing the negative consequences of pretrial detention. Paul Heaton, The Expansive Reach of Pretrial
Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 369, 375 (2020).
67. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 962 (2020); Megan
Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and bail, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT BY
THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 21, 25 (Erik Luna et al. ed., 2017) (“In practice, bail hearings are a messy affair.”).
68. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 681 (2018).
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A racial element exists here as well. Pretrial detention disproportionately
ensnares minority citizens.69 One reason is the potential for race-based biases when
humans drive pretrial outcomes. 70 America has a long history promoting
stereotypes connecting darkness of skin with criminality and violence.71 Despite
their professional training, judges use heuristics that can draw upon racialized
stereotypes of criminality.72 Empirical works specifically find evidence of racial bias
in pretrial decisions.73 Another reason for higher minority detention rates is that
minorities face more limited access to the financial resources necessary to
successfully secure release.74
Algorithms may ameliorate such race-based biases produced by subjective
human intuitions.75 Algorithmic risk instruments are seen as more objective
information-processing devices.76 There is also the hope for significant accuracy
rates from algorithmic prediction77 in that algorithmic risk forecasts are more likely
to be correct than human oracles.78 Behavioral psychological studies rather
consistently find that judgements based on science are more accurate than those
reliant upon individual intuition.79

69. Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ (citing studies).
70. Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1327 (2018).
71. Lydette S. Assefa, Assessing Dangerousness Amidst Racial Stereotypes: An Analysis of the Role
of Racial Bias in Bond Decisions and Ideas for Reform, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 657–58 (2019).
72. Brandon P. Martinez et al., Time, Money, and Punishment: Institutional Racial-Ethnic
Inequalities in Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, 66 CRIME & DELINQ. 837, 841 (2020).
73. Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 21, 30 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (citing studies). See generally
Meghan Sacks et al., Sentenced to Pretrial Detention: A Study of Bail Decisions and Outcomes, 40 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 661 (2015) (additional studies reporting racial disparities in pretrial); Tina L. Freiburger et al.,
The Impact of Race on the Pretrial Decision, 35 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 76 (2010).
74. Muhammad B. Sardar, Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives? Ending Cash Bail and its
Impact on Pretrial Incarceration, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2019); PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT CAN PRODUCE RACE-NEUTRAL RESULTS 2 (2017) (citing studies).
75. Jeffrey C. Singer et al., A Convergent Approach to Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in THE WILEYBLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 341, 343
(Karen Harrison & Bernadette Rainey eds., 2013).
76. Jessica Gabel Cino, Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice
System, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2018); Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: EvidenceBased Practices, 34 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 97, 99 (2018).
77. WILL DOBBIE & CRYSTAL YANG, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. PRETRIAL
SYSTEM 7 (2019); SARAH L. DESMARAIS & EVAN M. LOWDER, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS: A PRIMER FOR JUDGES,
PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 4 (2019).
78. Arthur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can Make our Jail System More Efficient,
Equitable, and Just, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 183 (2019); Seth J. Prins & Adam Reich, Can We Avoid
Reductionism in Risk Reduction?, 22 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 258, 259 (2018).
79. Karen Bogenschneider & Bret N. Bogenschneider, Empirical Evidence from State Legislators:
How, When, and Who Uses Research, 26 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 413, 413 (2020).
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D. Improve the Justifiability of Detention Decisions
Algorithmic risk tools are often lauded for reducing the arbitrariness of
pretrial release decisions.80 Human judgements may vary for reasons that
algorithms cannot, such as by the person being overworked, hungry, or
preoccupied.81 Though the algorithms are not intended to entirely usurp human
involvement in criminal justice outcomes, 82 the standardization inherent in
algorithmic outcomes offers several benefits. Algorithmic predictions can help
structure and thus enhance the human aspect of decision-making.83 The
automation afforded constrains discretion84 and thus potentially reduces
inconsistencies in detention outcomes.85 As well, the objectivity afforded by
algorithmic prediction may make pretrial release decisions appear more equitable86
and render release decisions more legally justifiable. 87
E. Conserve Criminal Justice Resources
The deployment of a risk tool in pretrial decision-making may save the
government significant monies, considering the requirement of vast resources to
service the state of mass incarceration. Pretrial incarceration is expensive. 88
Detaining those pending trial costs over $13 billion annually in the United States. 89
80. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 242, 267 (2019). See also PARTNERSHIP ON AI, REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN
THE
U.S.
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
7
(2019),
https://www.partnershiponai.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Report-on-Algorithmic-Risk-Assessment-Tools.pdf (indicating criminal justice
risk tools "provide rigor and reproducibility for life-critical decisions").
81. R. Barry Ruback et al., Communicating Risk Information at Criminal Sentencing in
Pennsylvania: An Experimental Analysis, 80 FED. PROB. 47 (2016).
82. Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Decision-Making: A Guide for Lawyers, 25 JUD. REV. 2, 6 (2020).
83. Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: Evidence-Based Practices, 34 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 97, 99 (2018).
84. Faye S. Taxman & Amy Dezember, The Value and Importance of Risk and Need Assessment
(RNA) in Corrections & Sentencing: An Overview of the Handbook, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND NEED
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 22, 23 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2017).
85. Cecelia Klingele, Making Sense of Risk, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 218, 220 (2020).
86. SARAH L. DESMARAIS & EVAN M. LOWDER, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS: A PRIMER FOR JUDGES,
PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 3 (2019).
87. Michael O’Hear, Actuarial Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Potential Consequences for Mass
Incarceration and Legitimacy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 193, 199 (2020); Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L.
Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans, in IZA INST. OF LABOR ECON. DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 12853, at 61 (Dec. 2019), http://ftp.iza.org/dp12853.pdf.
88. Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1506
(2018).
89. Brian P. Schaefer & Tom Hughes, Examining Judicial Pretrial Release Decisions: The Influence
of Risk Assessments and Race, 20 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC'Y 47, 48 (2019); see also COLIN DOYLE
ET
AL.,
BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 8 (2019),
https://ccjls.scholasticahq.com/article/9908-examining-judicial-pretrial-release-decisions-theinfluence-of-risk-assessments-and-race (citing $14 billion a year on pretrial detention).
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If risk tools lead to increasing the rate of pretrial release, states might be better able
to curtail unnecessary costs of incarceration,90 without unreasonably endangering
the public.91
Realistically, bipartisan support for pretrial reforms is not necessarily
indicative of a moral judgement denouncing the legitimacy of incarcerating large
numbers of people presumed innocent. Instead, it is a manifestation of a “virtue of
frugality” in that minimizing imprisonment allows for more conservative resource
allocations.92
Other forms of savings from automated risk tools are possible. The churn of
defendants through jails is significant. In 2018 alone, local jails counted almost 11
million bookings.93 Technology-enhanced risk tools thus may make pretrial
detention decision-making more economically efficient by curtailing the judicial
processes and time spent on the heavy volume of cases.94 A further anticipated
benefit is that risk tool adoption could shield jurisdictions from the stresses and
expenses from civil rights litigation brought to challenge practices relying heavily on
money bail as the key to freedom.95
IV. CHALLENGES FACING ALGORITHMIC RISK
The potential advantages to algorithmic risk in alleviating mass incarceration
in pretrial jurisdictions are encouraging. Still, naïve utilization of algorithmic risk
may undermine efforts. Several cautions are warranted for stakeholders to
consider. Findings from the author’s prior empirical studies on two popular
algorithmic risk tools used in pretrial settings are incorporated in this Section as
relevant to provide context for the issues raised. The tools are COMPAS (the
acronym for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions)
and the PSA (the acronym for the Public Safety Assessment). COMPAS is a
proprietary set of risk tools that separately predicts for the risks of general
recidivism and of violent recidivism.96 The PSA is designed exclusively for pretrial,

90. Michael Baglivio et al., The Usefulness of a General Risk Assessment, the Static Risk Assessment
(SRA), in Predicting Pretrial Failure: Examining Predictive Ability Across Gender and Race, 3 JUST.
EVALUATION J. 1, 3 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/24751979.2019.1668242.
91. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 304, 305 (2018).
92. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
537, 565 (2015).
93. OFF. OF JUST. PROGS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ253044, JAIL INMATES IN 2018 1 (Mar. 2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf; WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2020 (2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
94. Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2018).
95. COLIN DOYLE ET AL., BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 8 (2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=9a
804d1d-f9be-e0f0-b7cd-cf487ec70339&forceDialog=0.
96. Anne L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-Propublica
Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L. J. 131, 133 (2018).
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with scales evaluating both failure to appear and general recidivism.97 Both
COMPAS and the PSA are marketed as tools that may be implemented in
jurisdictions across the country and are popular in American criminal jurisdictions.98
A. Accuracy
In order to combat mass incarceration, officials must get risk assessment
“right” to raise its legitimacy in facilitating releases of defendants at lesser risk of
failure to appear.99 Overclassifying individuals as high-risk results in “gratuitous
surveillance and overtreatment,”100 while underpredicting endangers public safety.
Importantly, the guise of science should not relieve algorithmic tools from
empirical, legal, and ethical scrutiny. The Science Bench Book for Judges warns of
the myth of scientific objectivity as scientists, too, can be emotionally and
professionally attached to their work, causing their research conclusions to become
unconsciously biased or otherwise skewed.101 Hence, the fact that risk tool
developers are satisfied with their science-based products does not oblige criminal
justice officials to find these tools are sufficiently ready for real-world use,
considering the significant negative consequences that potentially result. “While
researchers may accept a moderate or less performance for a tool, for the practice
of justice this should not be accepted or tolerated since it diminishes the value of
the . . . tool.”102
In the forensic sciences field, the concept of tool accuracy is often discussed
in conjunction with the term validation. Validation involves an empirical review,
demonstrating that the tool performs its intended functions at an acceptable
level.103 A tool with results establishing strong performance numbers encourages
confidence by stakeholders and users.104 In contrast, an ineffective or highly

97. PRETRIAL
JUST.
INST.,
SCAN
OF
PRETRIAL
PRACTICES
27
(2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=b2
bd6339-8201-60f4-c262-a6317a409b82&forceDialog=0; Kristian Lum et al., The Impact of Overbooking
on a Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Tool (Jan. 23, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.08793.
98. Tim Brennan & William Dieterich, Correctional Offender Management Profiles for Alternative
Sanctions, in HANDBOOK OF RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOLS 3 (Jay P. Singh et al. eds., 2018) (regarding
COMPAS); Arnold Found., Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, ARNOLD FOUND. 3
(2013),
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF-research-summary_PSACourt_4_1.pdf (regarding PSA).
99. Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CAL. L. REV. 439, 446 (2020).
100. Whitney Threadcraft-Walker et. al.., Gender, Race/Ethnicity and Prediction: Risk in
Behavioral Assessment, 54 J. CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2018).
101. Brian Abbott, What is Science?, in SCIENCE BENCH BOOK FOR JUDGES 5, 10 (Peggy Hora et. al. eds.,
2019), https://www.judges.org/wp-content/uploads/Chapter2-SBB.pdf.
102. Faye S. Taxman & Amy Dezember, The Value and Importance of Risk and Need Assessment
(RNA) in Corrections & Sentencing: An Overview of the Handbook, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND NEED
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 22, 37 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2017).
103. Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 688 (2018).
104. Zachary Hamilton et al., Customizing Criminal Justice Assessments, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND
NEED ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 536, 567 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2017).
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inaccurate tool offers little utility, with the resulting waste of resources potentially
undermining any benefits the tool may otherwise offer. 105
Several reasons exist to suspect that tools may not perform as accurately as
stakeholders might expect or desire. One is that many agencies take an off-the-shelf
approach by adopting an available risk instrument and implementing it, and often
without empirically testing the tool’s ability to function adequately within their own
populations.106 Such a strategy is scientifically unreliable as a tool is not necessarily
generalizable to other jurisdictions.107 Tools are developed on distinct datasets and
thus reflect the risk-relevant attributes of the sample(s) tested, which carries a
limiting function: “Analytic methods can only work with the data given.
Unmeasured heterogeneity across offenders, neighborhoods, and jurisdictions
could possibly affect predictive accuracy.” 108 Risk factors, even the more objective
ones, are not necessarily universal.109 Criminal acts and their correlates can vary
depending on personal characteristics and experiences, times, geographies, sites,
environments, and circumstances.110 In sum, judges and legal practitioners, even if
they do not become experts in the science of risk assessment, should be mindful of
“what it is the oracle is predicting” and “of how often this oracle is right and
wrong.”111
Regrettably, the deployment of algorithmic risk tools is generally ahead of the
empirical evidence to substantiate their abilities.112 In other words, relatively few
validation studies exist (at least in the public realm) to allow for a sufficient
knowledge base to confirm that algorithmic tools offer a considerable degree of
accuracy.113 The conclusions of authors of a recent meta-analysis review of risk
tools across criminal justice, funded by the Council of State Governments Justice
Center, are salient in these respects. The review was unable to verify that available
105. Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risk Assessments, 16 J. EMPIR. LEG.
STUD. 175 (2019).
106. Robert Werth, Risk and Punishment: The Recent History and Uncertain Future of Actuarial,
Algorithmic, and “Evidence-Based” Penal Techniques, 13 SOC. COMPASS 1, 9 (2019).
107. James T. McCafferty, The Importance of Counties: Examining the Predictive Validity of a State
Juvenile Risk Assessment Instrument, 55 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 377, 378 (2016).
108. James Hess & Susan Turner, Accuracy of Risk Assessment in Corrections Population
Management: Where’s the Value Added?, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
157, 162 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2017).
109. Arthur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can Make our Jail System More Efficient,
Equitable, and Just, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 192 (2019).
110. Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 176 (2010).
111. Rhys Hester, Risk Assessment Savvy: The Imperative of Appreciating Accuracy and Outcome,
38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 246, 248 (2020).
112. Seth J. Prins & Adam Reich, Can We Avoid Reductionism in Risk Reduction?, 22 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 258, 259 (2018).
113. Brandon L. Garrett & Megan Stevenson, Open Risk Assessment, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279, 280
(2020); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail
Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1795 (2018); William D. Burrell, Risk and Needs Assessment in Probation
and Parole: The Persistent Gap Between Promise and Practice, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 54, 80 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2017).
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tools were highly accurate, and further found that performances from any single
tool varied in different settings and for types of failures predicted. 114 The review
concluded that for most of the tools, predictive validity statistics could only be
ascertained from one or two studies, and that such studies tended to be carried out
by the tool’s own developers.115
Consistent therewith, a review of the literature on the two popular risk tools
that were the focus of prior empirical studies (COMPAS and the PSA) revealed that
the available validation studies were typically performed by employees,
consultants, or research funding recipients of the tools’ owners.116 Inherent
conflicts of interest suggest diligence by external researchers to independently
audit risk tool performance to offer critical insights into how well risk assessment
tools actually perform in the field.117 My prior empirical research on risk assessment
performance in field settings was meant to respond to such calls.
For example, investigations of the COMPAS general and violent recidivism
scales (using one large sample) and the PSA failure to appear and general recidivism
scales (three large samples) showed some promise whereby each was able to
distinguish low, medium, and high-risk offenders in that the failure rates of released
individuals increased in a linear fashion. That is, for the full sample sets, the failure
rates increased as the ordinal prediction moved from low to medium to high risk. 118
However, this result was not consistent across sub-samples as will be addressed
farther below with respect to minority differences. 119 In any event, the ability to
rank groups of individuals as being more or less likely to fail is an exercise in
comparing on a relative basis and not a measure of absolute accuracy.
Alternative metrics attest to a tool’s ability to estimate actual failure rates.
Several examples from the prior studies may be illustrative. One of the projects on
the COMPAS violence risk scale found a true positive rate of 24 percent and a true
negative rate exceeding 90 percent.120 In other words, 24 percent of those
predicted at high risk of violence actually were arrested for a new violent crime,
while over ninety percent of those predicted at low or medium risk of violence were
not arrested for a new violent crime.121 As another example, the PSA across samples
114. Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Assessment Instruments in U.S.
Correctional Settings, in HANDBOOK OF RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOLS 3, 21–22 (Jay P. Singh et al. eds., 2018).
115. Id. at 20.
116. Melissa Hamilton, Evaluating Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 24 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 156, 181
(2021) [hereinafter Hamilton 3].
117. Alicia Solow-Niederman et. al., The Institutional Life of Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 705, 742 (2019); PARTNERSHIP ON AI, REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN THE
U.S.
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
31
(2019),
https://www.partnershiponai.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Report-on-Algorithmic-Risk-Assessment-Tools.pdf.
118. Hamilton 3, supra note 116, at 197 tbl. 2; Melissa Hamilton, Investigating Algorithmic Risk
and Race, 5 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Hamilton 4]; Melissa Hamilton, The
Biased Algorithm: Disparate Impact for Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2019) [hereinafter
Hamilton 5]; Melissa Hamilton, The Classification and Predictive Validity of a Violence Risk Scale
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hamilton 6].
119. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
120. Hamilton 6, supra note 118.
121. Hamilton 6, supra note 118.
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performed poorly in predicting those who would fail to appear if released (i.e., a
true positive rate of approximately 28 percent), but was much better at predicting
those who would appear for their court dates (i.e., a true negative rate of 84–88
percent, depending on the sample).122 True positive rates such as these below 30
percent indicate significant error rates for high-risk predictions specifically. Still,
these results with weak true positive rates do not mean that these tools are
meaningless but suggest some caution. Judges using these scales might give much
stronger weight to a prediction of success than of failure.
B. Demographic Equity
An important hope of advocates in adopting algorithmic risk is to improve the
equity of pretrial release decisions where experience finds that certain minority
groups suffer disproportionately in the state of mass incarceration.123 Risk tool
developers tend to characterize their tools as racially neutral: “Vendors promote
[algorithmic] models to the public and to the agencies that use them as the answer
to human bias, arguing that computers cannot harbor personal animus or individual
prejudice based on race.”124
Nonetheless, certain stakeholders have expressed concerns as to whether
algorithmic tools are as fair as expected, particularly concerning the potential for
adverse consequences to protected groups.125 A coalition of over 100 groups selfdescribed as comprising “civil and human rights, community, and data justice
leaders from across the United States” (e.g., ACLU, NAACP, Electronic Frontier
Foundation) signed “A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns” expressing
unease with fairness of risk assessment tools used in criminal justice. 126 The joint
statement expressly calls for greater transparency and for third party audits of the
underlying algorithms to check for race-based issues.127
One potential negative attribute would exist if a tool systematically produced
higher risk scores for minorities. Thus, if the tool predicts a greater proportion of
one group to fail if released than another, the result could signify disparate impact
on the higher scoring group.128 Notably, disparate impact does not require

122. Hamilton 3, supra note 116, at 200 tbl. 12.
123. Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding Problems with
Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 185, 186 (2019).
124. Id.
125. Sandra Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019).
126. African American Ministers in Action et al., The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment”
Instruments:
A
Shared
Statement
of
Civil
Rights
Concerns
2
(2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp, Using Algorithms to Address Trade-Offs Inherent
in Predicting Recidivism, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259, 262 (2020); Thomas Cohen & Christopher Lowenkamp,
Revalidation of the Federal PTRA: Testing the PTRA for Predictive Biases, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 234, 235
(2019).
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discriminatory motivation or intent129 and, thus, applies to a facially neutral policy
or practice,130 such as a science-derived risk tool. “[A] transparent, facially neutral
algorithm can still produce discriminatory results.”131 A reason to suspect that
minorities will be predicted as riskier is that these tools commonly weigh criminal
history heavily in their algorithms. Because statistics show that minorities in
America tend to be burdened with more serious criminal records, tools that include
criminal history predictors will tend to output higher risk scores for minorities. 132
The few studies to date on the performance of algorithmic risk with minorities
shows some evidence that minorities are more likely to be ranked at higher risk,
though this result is not consistent across studies and for all tools.133
Illustrative results from COMPAS and the PSA find some evidence for these
concerns. A prior study of the COMPAS general recidivism tool in a large Florida
county found that it classified as high risk 27 percent of black defendants compared
to 11 percent of white defendants.134 A research project on the PSA general
recidivism scale likewise produced variations in that, at two separate sites, black
defendants were far less likely to be classified in the low risk bin, about one-third
of black defendants were assigned to the low risk bin compared to almost half of
white defendants.135 These results show evidence of disparate impact in real-world
settings, confirming a cause for concern.
Another negative attribute might exist if an algorithmic tool is unable to
produce similar accuracy rates for the different subsets of a population. For
example, a risk assessment scheme that presumes risk tools are somehow
universal, generic, and culturally neutral may well be flawed and thus not perform
equally across minority groups.
The over or under estimation of risk that can ensue from this process is
entirely plausible given (a) the potential omission of meaningful risk
items specific to minority populations, (b) the inclusion of risk factors
that are more relevant to White offenders, and (c) variation in the
cross-cultural manifestation and expression of existing risk items. 136
A risk tool could yield unequal results for cultural minority groups if it fails to
incorporate or otherwise consider their unique “behavioral practices and
expectations, health beliefs, social/environmental experiences, phenomenology,
illness narratives, deviant conduct, and worldview.”137
129. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 121–22 (2017);
Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48
CUMB. L. REV. 67, 80 (2017).
130. Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 554 (2018).
131. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2017).
132. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 128, at 267.
133. Threadcraft-Walker et al., supra note 100 (citing studies).
134. Hamilton 1, supra note 17, at 290 n.143.
135. Hamilton 4, supra note 118.
136. Stephane M. Shepherd & Roberto Lewis-Fernandez, Forensic Risk Assessment and Cultural
Diversity: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 427, 429 (2016).
137. Id.
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Drawing on the prior empirical studies may provide relevant context. Studies
of COMPAS in the Florida jurisdiction revealed differences in predictive ability based
on race and ethnicity.138 COMPAS had a higher accuracy rate in predicting general
recidivism for black defendants, but a lower accuracy rate for predicting nonrecidivism, than white defendants.139 In a separate analysis dividing the sample
differently into two groupings of (a) Hispanics and (b) non-Hispanics (the latter
combining whites, blacks and other), findings showed that the low, medium, and
high risk bins held meaning for increasing rates of violent recidivism for nonHispanic defendants, but not for Hispanic defendants.140 For Hispanic individuals,
the violent reoffending rate for medium risk was actually below that of the low risk
bin.141 In other words, a single scheme of categorization was inappropriate: for the
COMPAS violent risk scale a three risk bin strategy (i.e., low, medium, high) had
meaning for non-Hispanic defendants, but for Hispanic defendants a two risk bin
scheme (e.g., low versus high) appeared more appropriate. Another finding was
that COMPAS frequently overpredicted the likelihood of general and violent
recidivism of Hispanic defendants.142
The prior study of the PSA similarly revealed differences in performance based
on group status, but not consistently. Comparing overall accuracy rates in two
separate samples for black versus white defendants on the new criminal offense
scale, the PSA’s ability to predict were similar for blacks and whites in one sample,
but not in the other.143 These results for the PSA indicate that racial equivalence
may exist for the same tool in certain criminal justice sites, but results may vary by
race to a statistically significant degree at other sites.
Algorithmic tools may be biased regarding gender as well. Most risk
assessment tools contain what are purported to be “gender neutral” factors such
as criminal history, age, mental health, and substance abuse.144 Some observers
have objected that purportedly neutral factors may not be so evenhanded in that
many of these factors result in higher correlations to recidivism for men, meaning
that the factors were far better predictors for males.145 The prior study of COMPAS
supported these suggestions in finding the tool systematically and significantly
overpredicted both general recidivism risk and violent recidivism risk for women.146
In the end, the presence of racial, ethnic, or gender differentials do not
automatically signify that these more systematic risk assessment tools should be
138. See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text.
139. Hamilton 1, supra note 17, at 286.
140. Hamilton 5, supra note 118, at 1565–66.
141. Hamilton 5, supra note 118, at 1565. For the general recidivism scale, while the low, medium,
and high bins indicated linearly greater rates for non-Hispanics, the rates at the medium and high bins
for Hispanics were similar. Id.
142. Hamilton 5, supra note 118, at 1566.
143. Hamilton 4, supra note 118.
144. Patricia Van Voorhis et al., Women’s Risk Factors and Their Contributions to Existing
Risk/Needs Assessment, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 261, 262 (2010).
145. VALERIE R. BELL, GENDER-RESPONSIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN CORRECTIONS 108 (2014).
146. Melissa Hamilton, The Sexist Algorithm, 37 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 145, 152 (2019) [hereinafter
Hamilton 7].

632

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

entirely banned. Stakeholders might need to consider the reasonableness of
tradeoffs between demographic injustice in the algorithms and the benefits from
safely reducing rates of detention. Notably, increasing release rates across a
jurisdiction may in other ways benefit protected groups.147
C. Levels of Risk
Risk tool outcomes often use risk bins to classify the population into ordinal
rankings. Descriptive labels are commonly applied, such as low, medium, and high
risk.148 Still, such categorical labeling is not consistent across tools as their numbers
(such as between three and six) and meanings (in terms of the degree of likelihood
of failure associated therewith) vary. This sort of simplistic system provides an easy
way to partition the population as more or less risky. However, it is important to
note that these are merely relative categorizations of the particular population
evaluated.
In terms of absolute estimates, no consensus exists as to what categorical bins
mean as the percentile probabilities of failure.149 Clinicians have no commonly
agreed definition of risk categories,150 statisticians have no accepted metric, and
there are no normative or legal distinctions for such labels.151
Individual risk tools may provide detailed context for each of its own
categories (e.g., provide a definition and corresponding recidivism rate estimate),
but these depictions will be unique to the specific tool. The recidivism rate
associated with the “high risk” group for one tool could be 70 percent, while in
another tool “high risk” might indicate an observed failure rate of 15 percent.
Hence, assumptions that even a “high risk” label signifies a serious risk of failure,
much less a more likely than not presumption of failure, are erroneous. In pretrial,
then, judges should be cognizant of the probabilities that are relevant in their
jurisdictions with the specific tool deployed.
Referring to the prior research again for illustration purposes, the study of the
COMPAS general recidivism tool indicated a significant failure rate for those
classified as “high risk,” as over 70 percent were rearrested.152 However, there were
significant ethnic differences when comparing Hispanic versus non-Hispanic
defendants: with COMPAS high risk classifications, 57 percent of Hispanic
defendants were rearrested compared to 75 percent of non-Hispanics
147. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 128, at 260.
148. Ashley B. Batastini et al., Communicating Violence Risk During Testimony: Do Different
Formats Lead to Different Perceptions Among Jurors?, 25 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 92, 93 (2019).
149. Daniel A. Krauss et al., Risk Assessment Communication Difficulties: An Empirical Examination
of the Effects of Categorical Versus Probabilistic Risk Communication in Sexually Violent Predator
Decisions, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 532, 534 (2018).
150. Daniel J. Neller & Richard I. Frederick, Classification Accuracy of Actuarial Risk Assessment
Instruments, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 141, 142 (2013).
151. J.C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and Actuarial Risk
Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. PROB. 52, 55 (2011).
152. Melissa Hamilton, Risk Assessment Tools in the Criminal Legal System: Theory and Practice
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(2020),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/a92d7c30-32d4-4b49-9c576c14ed0b9894/riskassessmentreportnovember182020.pdf [hereinafter Hamilton 8].
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defendants.153 In studying the COMPAS violent recidivism scale regarding gender
differences, a high risk classification of violent offending yielded a 52 percent failure
rate for men, whereas the failure rate for women was half of that at 25 percent,
suggesting a gendered disparity in absolute risk despite the same risk label
assigned.154 In both cases, the stigmatizing label of high risk in the same samples
meant a dramatically different likelihood of reoffending based on Hispanic ethnicity
and gender.
The studies into the PSA failure to appear tool likewise found that categorical
labels had no consistent meaning in the field. While the high-risk bin achieved
relatively equivalent failure rates across sites (about 28 percent), the low and
medium risk bin failure rates each differed to a statistically significant degree. 155 In
other words, the predictions of low and medium risk with this PSA scale were
associated with different proportions of failure depending on the jurisdiction.
The foregoing results, in addition to showing evidence that categorical risk
bins are not necessarily associated with equivalent rates of failure, also highlight
another issue. Notice the results specifically for the COMPAS violent tool in scoring
women with the PSA failure to appear tool (for both genders combined) in that they
yielded relatively modest percentages in its high-risk bin.156 A COMPAS prediction
of high risk of violence was associated with a 25 percent rate of violent arrest for
women, while a PSA prediction of high risk of failure to appear was associated with
a 28 percent failure rate.157 These findings exemplify the caution about any
presumption that an algorithmic “high risk” outcome suggests the individual is
highly likely to fail if released in percentage terms. A high-risk labeling may not
mean in real terms that the individual is more likely than not to fail. This sentiment
has policy relevance. The goal of reducing mass incarceration could be thwarted if
a “high-risk” prediction itself justified detention because the vast majority of
individuals so labeled, at least in these real-world examples, would likely have
succeeded if released.
Overall, the foregoing examples for COMPAS and the PSA highlight the need
for more clarity in the algorithmic risk field about how risk categorizations are used
and the particular failure rates that are associated with them. These meanings vary
by tool, setting, type of failure event, and for sub-groups.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The general comments from the institutional creator of the PSA—used as a
case example herein—demonstrate the goals that proponents seek in advocating
the implementation of algorithmic risk tools to facilitate release decisions.
From the beginning, we believed that an easy-to-use, data-driven risk
assessment could greatly assist judges in determining whether to
153. Hamilton 5, supra note 118, at 1565.
154. Hamilton 7, supra note 146, at 150.
155. Hamilton 4, supra note 116.
156. Hamilton 8, supra note 154.
157. Hamilton 8, supra note 152; Hamilton 5, supra note 118.
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release or detain defendants who appear before them. And this could
be transformative. In particular, we believed that from switching from
a system based solely on instinct and experience to one in which judges
have access to scientific, objective risk assessment tools could further
our central goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making
the most effective, fair, and efficient use of public resources. 158
In the end, overly optimistic—or overly pessimistic—views on the role of
algorithmic risk tools to help reduce mass incarceration through pretrial jail
detentions are not confirmed by the state of the scientific studies. Trade-offs are
necessary when attempting such a significant reform in criminal justice that impacts
many lives and institutions. The existing evidence suggests that continued efforts
to improve algorithmic tools are justified. Stakeholders are encouraged though to
also ramp up efforts to fund independent researchers to inform on how well the
tools actually perform and to suggest ways to reduce any flaws discovered. Tackling
mass incarceration through algorithmic risk requires a multidisciplinary
engagement involving the law and empirical sciences.

158. Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, ARNOLD FOUND., 2 (2003),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=79
4208cc-3e92-23fe-40a7-6f02885b01a0&forceDialog=0.

